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Excerpt from Collusion in Hierarchical Agency Abstract: We study a model where shareholders can use auditors' reports to contract with a privately informed manager but the manager can bribe the auditors to manipulate their reports. Such auditors are useful if they have good information and the liability of the manager is high. In the optimal contract under collusion, even with unbounded punishments and costless auditing, production does not reach its optimal level. Raising the punishment for the manager raises the bribe he is willing to offer the auditor raising the cost of preventing collusion. When liability grows without bound and part of the punishment is non-transferable maximum deterrence will not be optimal. To model cross-checking mechanisms, we distinguish internal (costless but may collude with the manager) from external (costly but never collude) auditors. We prove that the optimal contract might specify random external audits. We consider a self-interested external auditor and find that the optimal contract is unchanged Finally, we present a model where allowing collusion is the optimal strategy for the principal. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

Szczegóły książki

Kategoria Książki po angielsku Economics, finance, business & management Finance & accounting Accounting

• Pełny tytuł: Collusion in Hierarchical Agency (Classic Reprint)
• Autor: Fred Kofman
• Język: Angielski
• Oprawa: Miękka
• Liczba stron: 104
• EAN: 9781332255436
• ISBN: 9781332255436
• ID: 09831526
• Wydawca: Forgotten Books
• Waga: 150 g
• Wymiary: 229 × 152 × 6 mm
• Data wydania: 05. August 2015

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