Saving the Differences

Crispin Wright's "Truth and Objectivity" brought about a reorientation of the metaphysical debates concerning realism and truth. The essays in this companion volume prefigure, elaborate or defend the proposals put forward in that landmark work. The collection includes the Gareth Evans memorial lecture in which the programme of "Truth and Objectivity" was first announced, as well as all of Wright's published reactions to the extensive commentary his study provoked. It presents substantial new developments and applications of the pluralistic outlook on the realism debates proposed in "Truth and Objectivity" and further pursues its distinctive minimalist conceptions of truth and of truth-aptitude. Among the papers are discussions of coherence conceptions of truth, of Hilary Putnam's views on truth, and of the classical debate between correspondence, coherence, pragmatism and deflationary conceptions of the notion. Others are concerned with Kripke's famous argument against physicalist conceptions of sensation: the distinction between minimal truth-aptitude and cognitive command; a novel prospectus for a philosophy of vagueness; and a new proposal about the most resilient interpretation of relativism.