Code: 02616827

Berkeley's Puzzle

Name: Berkeley's Puzzle
Brand: Oxford University Press
SKU: 02616827
Price: 464.33 PLN
Availability: BackOrder

by John Campbell

Language: English
Binding: Hardback
Number of pages: 224
Publisher: Oxford University Press, 2014
More about this

464.33 zł

Availability:

50/50

We think title might be available. Upon your order we will do our best to get it within 6 weeks.
We search the world

Availability alert

Add to wishlist

The Iron Lady
73.97 zł -11 %
Buy
Nigeria
249.87 zł
Buy
JOHN ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL, ASSOCIATE JUSTI
221.97 zł
Buy
Poems
81.90 zł -5 %
Buy
Life of John, Lord Campbell
128.12 zł
Buy
Reference and Consciousness
326.79 zł
Buy

Give this book as a present today

Order book and choose Gift Order.
We will send you book gift voucher at once. You can give it out to anyone.
Book will be send to donee, nothing more to care about.

Book gift voucher sample Read more

Availability alert

We will watch availability for you

Enter your e-mail address and once book will be available,
we will send you a message. It's that simple.

You get 269 loyalty points

Book synopsis

Sensory experience seems to be the basis of our knowledge and conception of mind-independent things. The puzzle is to understand how that can be: even if the things we experience (apples, tables, trees etc), are mind-independent how does our sensory experience of them enable us to conceive of them as mind-independent? George Berkeley thought that sensory experience can only provide us with the conception of mind-dependent things, things which cannot exist when they aren't being perceived. It's easy to dismiss Berkeley's conclusion but harder to see how to avoid it. In this book, John Campbell and Quassim Cassam propose very different solutions to Berkeley's Puzzle. For Campbell, sensory experience can be the basis of our knowledge of mind-independent things because it is a relation, more primitive than thought, between the perceiver and high-level objects and properties in the mind-independent world. Cassam opposes this 'relationalist' solution to the Puzzle and defends a 'representationalist' solution: sensory experience can give us the conception of mind-independent things because it represents its objects as mind-independent, but does so without presupposing concepts of mind-independent things. This book is written in the form of a debate between two rival approaches to understanding the relationship between concepts and sensory experience. Although Berkeley's Puzzle frames the debate, the questions addressed by Campbell and Cassam aren't just of historical interest. They are among the most fundamental questions in philosophy.